Disney, or Di-Si-Ni as it is called in Chinese, might be up for another Disneyland Paris experience. At least, that is what Mr. Jianlin Wang seems to think. Last Sunday, Mr. Wang, who also happens to be China’s wealthiest businessman, gave an hour-long interview on CCTV, China’s state television. Criticizing Disney’s outdated intellectual property, the lack of a cultural fit, changing consumer preferences, and high prices, Mr. Wang lashed out pretty strongly. Of course, his opinions may be tainted by the fact that he is trying to break into the theme park business with 15-20 new locations over the next few years himself. Nonetheless, he made some interesting points in his interview. First, he poked fun at Disney’s poor choice of location. Shanghai is a huge metropolis with millions of visitors and a coastal population that has been exposed to Western tastes and lifestyles over a long period of time. However, so Mr. Wang, Shanghai is too cold in the winter and too humid in the summer to be an attractive destination for theme park visitors. For those who have followed the story of Disneyland Paris, the dangers of choosing a less than ideal location may sound all too familiar. When Disneyland Paris (then “Europdisney”) first opened, they seemed to have focused too much on the upside of market opportunities – predictions of a stable, growing economy, the upcoming opening of the channel between England and France, as well as Paris being the most popular tourist destination in Europe. What had been overlooked, if not deliberately ignored was the often nasty climate in the Paris area, as well as looming changes in the European economy and in global tourism. Mr. Wang also argues that Disney’s offering is not China-specific enough and presents a poor cultural fit with Chinese consumers’ demands. One might argue that Chinese consumers, just like consumers anywhere else worldwide, continue to be in love with everything from Mickey Mouse to Jungle Book to Frozen. True, but the Disney experience is about more than just characters and intellectual property. It is also about an entire experience and a service delivered – such as food that fits Chinese preferences, merchandise that is affordable, and friendly employees who make the happiest place in the world seem – well – happy. Again, the Paris experience should have taught Disney that all of these things do matter – from European’s distaste of overpriced fast food to labor relations and employee management that follows fundamentally different principles. Shanghai Di-Si-Ni will open to the public only mid June and the verdict therefore is still out. But it is an interesting – and expensive – experiment that we should continue to watch.
Posts Tagged ‘China’
In a recent article, Fortune magazine questions Uber’s approach to global markets. Apparently, Uber has recently announced that it is loosing more than $ 1 billion in China annually, which is not a small sum to loose even for a unicorn valued more than $60 billion. One could easily attribute the losses to the fact that Uber is still engaged in a battle over market share with local competitor Didi Kuaidi. However, as the Fortune article correctly points out, local competition may just be one factor. There are also regulatory hurdles, friction with taxi drivers and unions, and challenges with consumer adoption – in China, and in other markets from “Rio to Rome“, as the Voice of America recently remarked. Similar troubles are reported in a recent online article by TechCrunch, which reports of Uber’s trouble with “aggression, legislation and government opposition” in Colombia. On the one hand, Uber has been remarkably sensitive to local conditions. For instance, they added motorbike service in India and auto-rickshaw serve in Pakistan, which is a smart way to localize its service offering. On the other hand, it seems as if Uber has often ignored the basics of international business that every student worldwide learns from standard textbooks. These basics include the necessity of a sound analysis of the external environment in foreign target markets. There is an abundance of simple analytical tools such as the PEST framework, the CAGE model or Porter’s Five Forces that can assist in these matters. Such analyses would probably have revealed to Uber that next to economic conditions (such as local competition) there are also political-administrative factors such as the regulatory environment, or socio-cultural factors (such as the importance of networks) that would pose serious questions for their market entry strategies. When it comes to regulation, rather than its aggressive John Wayne-style approach of shooting first and asking later, asking for permission first may have been better in some countries. For the same countries, a longer-term approach of building relationships first before executing on a strategy might also have been advisable. Then again, Uber is successful in many markets, and ignoring local conditions for the sake of a more or less standardized model may have been part of a deliberate strategy. There is, however, also the option that Uber is still a young company that will learn and get better overtime. Sometimes, learning from mistakes is the best way to learn.
American fast food holding company Yum Brands announced that it would restructure its China business. Normally, there’s nothing wrong with finding a better approach to deal with the local market environment (quite to the contrary, actually), but this case seems to be different. Yum’s major brands KFC and Pizza Hut have been struggling in the Chinese market in recent years (see other posts on this blog). First, in 2012, antibiotics and growth hormones were found in KFC chicken, then Pizza Hut made some bad calls with regards to their menu and pricing, and most recently competition from Chinese fast food chains got rather intense. Yum brands had lost their appeal and started to loose money. This led to Yum headquarters making a bold move by cutting the Chinese market loose from global operations. Had it only been in order to give local operations more control over decisions on their China strategy, this might have been a good move, but it’s been reported that it is largely an attempt to shield US operations from risk. That could mean even tighter controls and a narrower look on the financials, and it could also result in a complete lack of support. Potentially, even damage to the global brands could emanate from the Chinese market.
Most of my inspiration for specific blog topics comes from current news items. And often, I discover those when traveling on long haul flights– one of the few times when my addiction to all things in print and some quiet downtime without interruptions intersect perfectly. June 17 was such an occasion. Two different papers ran a total of three stories with similar content. The Financial Times reports that European carmakers fear that the “China cash cow is dying”. Mercedes, BMW and their peers had such high hopes to be milking that cow for years to come, but recent developments have triggered a change of perspective. A slowing economy, rising global and domestic competition and limits of car ownership have led to anything from revised growth predictions for some to actual year-on-year declines in car sales for others. With similar declines in Brazil and Russia, this could end not so pretty for the automotive industry. Which leads me to an article the Wall Street Journal ran on the same day. Real estate developers, retailers, and consumer goods manufacturers alike have long predicted a gold rush in India – a market with a growing middle class. Or so, they thought. Over the last decade approximately 250 new shopping malls have been developed and it seems that many of them are struggling with weak sales. By now, so the paper, India’s middle class should have grown to approximately 400 million, but recent estimates by McKinsey count it at a meager 10 million. And, finally, the Financial Times also reports on Swiss food giant Nestlé’s recent decision to cut their African workforce in 21 different African countries by 15 %. At first glance, the reasons seem similar. Only four years ago, in 2011, the African Development Bank had estimated the African middle class at 330 million. A 2014 survey by Standard Bank, however, concluded that the middle was only approximately 15 million across 11 of Africa’s most important countries. On the other hand, however, that may not be the full story as the continued growth in Africa of retailers such as Wal-Mart or Carrefour suggests. Nestlé may simply have misjudged the demand for its highly standardized product offerings and it may have underestimated the challenges coming from poor logistics infrastructure. The truth probably lies in the middle, and that leaves us with a generally bad aftertaste: the promise that the BRIC countries held just a few years ago seems to be fading quickly. And if not even emerging markets hold any more promise, what does?
KFC has been in China for almost 30 years. The first of Yum Brands’ restaurants to move into China has reported sharp profit and revenue declines for their first quarter China business recently. Some media outlets such as the WSJ argue that, with competition increasing, the novelty character of brands such as KFC simply seems to wear off, while others such as Reuters reason that recent food scandals have hurt consumer perceptions of the brand. Yum Brands actually seemed to have done a decent job to cater to Chinese tastes by enriching their offering beyond the usual staples by offering localized variations and entirely new menu items, including coffee drinks. For a company that runs more than 6,000 stores, these are not trivial changes. Reality, however, is that the Chinese market is complex and adaptations to the market strategy have to be made constantly. The Chinese market has many moving pieces from being hyper-competitive to low brand loyalty to being very prone to ever-changing fads. Another cultural trait, the relatively distinct status orientation of Chinese culture makes Yum’s latest move an interesting one – the addition of high-priced Italian restaurants to its portfolio. Viewed from the rabbit hole of international marketing, the question seems to be how much of this development is rooted in the many idiosyncrasies of China and how much is just the normal maturity of a brand along the product life cycle?
According to a variety of news outlets, California-based restaurant chain Johnny Rockets is planning for a major expansion in China. The 1950s themed chain currently has more than 300 corporate- and franchise-owned restaurants, about a third of which are in international locations. For the expansion, the company already entered into a joint venture agreement with its operator and franchise partner in Malaysia and a Malaysian owner-operator of department stores (that will also serve as locations in China). Beginning in 2016, Johnny Rockets will put approximately 100 stores into various locations throughout China. China definitely has an appetite for foreign fast food, especially if it is tied to a unique experience, but the road may be bumpy. The chain is following the likes of McDonald’s, KFC and Burger King, which have all had to manage steep, painful and expensive learning curves. It is to be hoped that Johnny Rockets will learn from their competitors’ mistakes, and make important adaptations to their business model and their menus. This author is not so sure if the chili cheese fries will catch on in China. Maybe we’ll read about Johnny Rockets again in the not too distant future…
Today’s Wall Street Journal (European Edition) ran an interesting piece on the Chinese market for fast food. Many domestic and regional competitors, so the Journal, are giving foreign fast food giants such as McDonald’s and KFC / Yum Brands a run for their money. Competitors such as Xiabu Xiabu (which serves Chinese hot pot), Da Niang Dumplings (serving – yes – dumplings), or Taiwanese Ting Hsin International Group’s dico’s (serving fried chicken) are expanding rapidly in China. Not only do they seem to cater better to local tastes, they are also moving into less-developed cities that their foreign competitors have largely neglected so far. Foreign competitors, in an entirely rational manner, often focus on target groups that have exposure to Western lifestyles and want foreign fast food – which often restricts them to affluent populations in a few select cities along the coastline. For many a company, that reduces the astronomical potential of a market with 1.35 billion population to an addressable market of a puny few million. In a way, it appears as if some street-smart Chinese companies patiently waited and intentionally let McDonald’s do the heavy lifting. Being a first mover can have its disadvantages, but often, it turns out to be more of a burden and a disadvantage. It is not uncommon for the first company to overcome certain regulatory or cultural hurdles, only to have the second mover and everyone else walk through the door that they have pushed open with much difficulty. It could well be that McDonald’s invested its time and resources to educate Chinese consumers, have them develop a love for fast food, and now its competitors are reaping the benefits. Nobody’s fault really, just interesting to observe…
I recently came across this older post that discusses why American companies fail in China. The author of the post singles out Mattel, eBay, Google, and Home Depot and also offer his opinion on the reasons for their failure: a lack of flexibility, the failure to localize, or the existence of a strong competitor. In summary, so the author, it boils down to the fact that American companies have an inability to grasp how different the Chinese market is. I say, tell me something that is new! It’s not a secret that China is a difficult and different market; and it is also not big news that American companies often fail when entering foreign markets (e.g. WalMart in Germany, The Gap in Germany and Korea, Pizza Hut in Austria, eBay in Japan). The analysis therefore has to go a little deeper. It is not uncommon for large multinational corporations to side with standardization in case of doubt. Adaptation to foreign markets can be feasible and affordable if a company is only dealing with one, two, maybe even ten foreign markets. Beyond a certain number of markets served, however, adaptation becomes very costly and very complex. If preserving a business model (marketing approach, processes, etc.) is important to a company, then the question should not be HOW do we enter a market such as China, but SHOULD we enter a market such as China? If standardization is so important to sustaining competitive advantage of a company, then it should probably not sacrifice it on the altar of a very different market, but select foreign target markets very carefully. Sometimes this may mean to say no to markets even as large and juicy as China.
Most of the time, it catches my eye when companies fail internationally. This focus on failure may be the result of my academic training, and it may have something to do with my cultural roots. However, every once in a while I am really intrigued, even fascinated, by how smart some companies are. Hermes International SCA has developed a completely new brand for the Chinese market, Shang Xia. As the Wall Street Journal recently reported, Hermes has now spent several years to build the brand and isn’t expecting to break even before 2016. They understand that Western luxury brands will not continue to harvest the benefits of newly gained affluence in China forever. With the growth in the segment slowing down – from 20 % annually to about 2 % this year – the high demand for foreign brands will eventually cease. Chinese consumers are becoming ever more discerning and new brands, and more and more local brands, will succeed. Hermes has recognized this many years ago and made the right decision by building a strong local luxury brand. McDonalds (and yes, I admit, they compete in quite a different industry), however, is experiencing rapid declines in China for the exact same reasons. Competition from newer entrants is intense, and more and more Chinese alternatives eat into their market share. The time when being “foreign” or “American” was enough to drive purchase decisions will soon be over, and companies worldwide are well advised to adapt their China strategies.
And, by the way, I just realized that I ended up talking about failure again, after all.